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FEDERAL COURT POWER TO ADMIT TO BAIL
STATE PRISONERS PETITIONING FOR HABEAS CORPUS
IT IS WELL SETTLED that a state prisoner may test the constitution-
ality of his conviction by petitioning a federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus.' Undetermined, however, is the power of fed-
eral courts to release the state prisoner on bail pending disposition
of the petition. Recently, in Johnston v. Marsh,2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had before it petitions for
prohibition and mandamus to expunge the order of a district court
releasing on bail a state prisoner8 who had petitioned for habeas
corpus. 4  The court of appeals, in denying the writs, held that the
district court had acted within its jurisdiction.'
1 63 STAT. 105 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1952). Writs of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts, and any judge
of a court of appeals, w-ithin their respective jurisdictions. Cf. 62 STAT. 967 (1948),
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (195z). The exhaustion of state remedies is a prerequisite of relief
by habeas corpus from a federal court. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249 (1886) ,
United States ex rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 9z2 ( 3d Cir. 1954.), cert. denied
348 U.S. 851 (954); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). Cf. discussion
by Justice Frankfurter in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Notes, 6o HAry. L.
REV. 8Si (1941-, 49 MICH. L. REV. 6xi (195x), 34 MINN. L. REv. 653 (1950).
'T.r-d. 58 (3 d Cir. 1955), noted in 42 VA. L. REV. 585 (x956).
he relator and a co-defandant were tried jointly for Tn6 separate indictments
charging misconduct in public office. On appeal from a conviction and denial of a new
trial, it was asserted that the consolidated trial prejudiced the relator. The appellate
court, however, affirmed the conviction, Commonwealth v. Ackerman, 176 Pa. Super.
8o, io6 A.zd 886 (.954); the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied appeal without
opinion, Appendix to Brief for Petitioner, p. 5a, Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.zd 528
( 3d Cir. z955); and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 348 U.S.
951 (1955). The relator thereupon began serving his two-year jail sentence.
' United States ex rel. Ackerman v. Commonwealth, 133 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Pa.
1955), noted in 69 HARV. L. REV. 752 (x956). The relator was suffering from
advanced diabetes which seriously affected his vision and caused or contributed to
numerous other ailments. He was, at the time of trial, practically blind in his left
eye, and the condition of his right eye was progressively deteriorating. According to
medical testimony, the relator had a fair probability of retaining the sight in his right
eye with proper medical attention, but continued confinement would probably lead to
total blindness.
' This was the only point decided. The court did not pass upon the propriety of the
admission to bail: "We are not for a moment suggesting that the district court here
did make a mistake. Neither are we saying that he was right. That point is not
before us. What we are deciding is that the court was acting within its jurisdiction.
Since it was acting within its jurisdiction the writs prayed for are inappropriate because
It is conceded that no express statutory authorization supports the
action of the district court;6 but it has been suggested that this support
might be found elsewhere. For example, section 2243 of the Judicial
Code 7 requires that the district courts, in hearing habeas corpus petitions,
"dispose of the party as law and justice require." Arguably, the bail
power asserted in the Johnston case is implicit in this statutory direc-
tive." A more acceptable justification, however, is suggested by the
proposition that the power of a federal court to admit to bail depends
not on statutory authorization, but is, instead, inherent in the court. This
proposition finds support in language of an early Supreme Court case,' in
a recent opinion by Justice Douglas sitting as a circuit judge,10 and in sev-
eral of the lower federal court cases which have considered the prob-
lem." In Principe v. Ault, 2 for example, a federal district court,
granting bail pending the hearing of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus, justified its action, by reasoning that since a federal statute em-
powered the district courts to hear petitions for habeas corpus, the com-
mon law should define the manner in which that power could be exer-
cised.13 It is clear that the common law courts had power to grant bail
independent of any statute.'4
Additional support for the conclusion that federal courts may admit
prisoners to bail without express congressional authority is found in
Supreme Court Rule 49,1' which regulates bail in the federal courts
prohibition and mandamus only run against the judge when he has acted beyond his
judicial authority or has refused to act within it." 227 F.2d at 531.
'Brief for Respondent, pp. 7-8, Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528 ( 3d Cir. 1955)-
See also the language of the court: "If there is found specific statutory authority for
admission to bail in such a case as this, such a provision would end the matter." 227
F.2d at 530.
7 62 STAT. 965 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 7243 (952).
' This argument was accepted by the Court in the Johnston case. 227 F.2d at
530-31. The argument is criticized in 42 VA. L. REv. 585, 587 (1956).
'In Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 4o, 63 (1903) (dictum), the Court said that it
was "unwilling to hold that the Circuit Courts possess no power in respect of admitting
to bail other than as specifically vested by statute. .. "
"0 Petition of Johnson, 72 Sup. Ct. 1o28 (5952). Justice Douglas stated that the
power specified by the statutes and rules is not exclusive, and did not by implication deny
a justice power to grant bail incident to ruling on the application.
" In re Gannon, 27 F.2d 362, 363 (E.D. Pa. 1928) ; Artukovic v. Boyle, 107
F. Supp. ix (S.D. Cal. I95z) ; Ewing v. Unted States, z*o Fed. 241 (6th Cir. 1917).
12 62 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ohio 1945), noted in 19 So. CALIF. L. REv. 4.58 (1946).
*1 62 F. Supp. at 281.
1" The Queen v. Spilsbury, [1898] 2 Q.B. 615, 620 (dictum).
"r U.S. SUP. CT. RULE 49, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1955).
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while appeals are pending from decisions involving the disposition of
writs of habeas corpus1 6 Since there does not appear to be any direct
congressional authority for the bail power contained in this rule, if the
rule is valid, it would follow that a bail power does inhere in the federal
courts.' 7
Assuming, then, that the action of the district court in Johnston v.
Marsh was not beyond its power, there remains the further question
whether it is desirable for district courts to admit state prisoners to bail
prior to the hearing on the habeas corpus petition. Some support for
granting bail at this stage may perhaps be inferred from Supreme
Court Rule 49, which provides that federal courts shall grant bail pend-
ing appeal of a decision discharging a prisoner on habeas corpus, and
may grant bail pending appeal of a decision discharging a writ after
it has been issued. 8 That the rule authorizes bail regardless of what
disposition is made of the writ after it has been issued would suggest the
appropriateness of granting bail in advance of the hearing on the writ.
On the other hand, however, the fact that Rule 49 requires bail in
certain instances and allows bail in others calls attention to a considera-
tion which has an especial significance when the habeas corpus petitioner
is a state prisoner. The distinction drawn by the rule undoubtedly was
prompted by a recognition that the function of bail is to prevent the
confinement of a prisoner before it is finally established that he should
be confined. Accordingly, the rule evaluates the right to bail by the
probability that the confinement is proper; and, presumably, a federal
district court, when proceeding independently of the rule, should
evaluate the right to bail in the same manner. When a state confine-
ment is involved, however, the additional consideration of the sensi-
tivity of the federal-state relationship should be taken into account.'"
"The Third Circuit counterpart of U.S. Sup. CT. RULE 49 is 3D CIR. RULE 15.
The latter, however, is not a literal copy of the former. Rule x5 completely excludes
paragraph 5 of Rule 49, but the first four paragraphs are very similar. Cf. Pino v.
Nicolls, 211 F.2d 393 (st Cir. 1954), wherein the court declared that they were
without power to prescribe a rule of procedure for the district court to admit to ball
under Rule 45, the predecessor of Rule 49.
7 See 69 HARV. L. REV. 752, 753 (.956).
", See United States ex rel. Ackerman v. Commonwealth, 133 F. Supp. 627 (W.D.
Pa. 1955).
"See United States ex rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922 (3 d Cir. 195,0, in
which the State of Pennsylvania, joined by the attorneys general of forty other states,
opposed as unconstitutional this type of action by the federal district courts. See 25
STATE GOVT. 249 (952)5 Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D.
[Vol. 6: 66
The determination of a prisoner's guilt by state courts should carry with
it, for purposes of bail, a presumption that the procedure was fair.
Therefore, in evaluating the probability that a state confinement is
proper, a federal court should give considerable deference to the state
judicial machinery and should require a strong showing of irregularity
before indulging the assumption upon which the grant of bail is neces-
sarily premised." In this connection, it would hardly be relevant for
the federal courts to take into account state bail policy, since that policy
will be directed primarily to situations where the legality of confinement
is largely undetermined. And even the state bail policy regarding habeas
corpus petitions by convicted prisoners should not be particularly in-
fluential, since that policy does not take into account the importance of
maintaining a satisfactory relationship between two independent court
systems.2
In fact, it would appear doubtful that any showing made in an appli-
cation for habeas corpus by a state prisoner could outweigh the im-
portance of according a presumption of validity to the state procedure.
Obviously, matters relating to the health of prisoners are to be regulated
by means short of bail.22 Perhaps, then, the exercise of the inherent
power to admit to bail, asserted by the court in the instant case, should
have awaited a favorable disposition of the merits of the habeas corpus
petition.
171 (1948); Notes, 4 UTAH L. REV. 260 (1954)
, 
41 CALIF. L. REV. 483 (1953).
Cf. Note, 6 DUKE B.J. 48 (1956).
,oSee 69 HARV. L. REV. 752, 754 (956).
- In the present case, the Pennsylvania statutes would prohibit bail in habeas corpus
proceedings where the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1905 (Purdon i95i).
" For discussion of the factors taken into consideration by the courts in past de-
cisions, see Comment, 3 STAN. L. REV. 167 (i95o) 5 Note, 27 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 56
(1952).
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